Africa Insight & Strategy 05 August 2026

Africa's strategic position in the US-China rivalry

Jeremy Stevens | Simon Freemantle

In prior reports in this series, we have argued that the US-China rivalry is the central and defining feature of the new, unfolding, geopolitical era. Africa is a key site of this geopolitical rivalry, which manifests across a variety of terrains. This carries profound risks for the continent – as it does for all countries, whether so-called “middle powers” or more peripheral global players. Yet, there is an equal array of opportunities presented by the geopolitical shifts under way. Capturing these opportunities requires astute and strategic positioning, anchored – as we suggested here – by a position of ‘active non-alignment'.
At the same time, Africa's geopolitical relevance is also becoming broader than the US-China rivalry alone. The continent increasingly occupies the intersection of many of the defining structural shifts reshaping the global economy. The global energy transition cannot occur without Africa's copper, cobalt, manganese, platinum-group metals, graphite and rare earths. Food security increasingly depends on Africa's vast uncultivated arable land, freshwater resources and agricultural productivity. The search for resilient and politically secure supply chains is redirecting manufacturing, logistics and investment towards jurisdictions that offer diversification beyond traditional Asian production hubs. Digitalisation requires new markets, data infrastructure and youthful consumers. Climate adaptation, carbon markets and biodiversity preservation similarly elevate Africa's strategic importance.
In previous decades, Africa was often viewed through the narrow lenses of development assistance or humanitarian concern. Increasingly, however, the world's largest economies require Africa to solve their own strategic challenges. This represents a profound shift. Africa is no longer peripheral to global economic transformation; rather, it has become one of its central theatres. The implication is that Africa's bargaining position is strengthened not because of any single geopolitical rivalry, but because multiple structural forces are simultaneously converging on the continent.
In this report, and with this broader context in mind, we step back to consider how African countries are positioning themselves between the US and China, and what capacity they would need to convert that position into genuine leverage.
The paper proceeds in five steps.
(1) We begin by outlining what it is that African leaders have stated to be their primary demands as they engage with the US and China, and other influential foreign partners. These relate to (i) infrastructure; (ii) jobs and industrialisation (not simply extraction); (iii) respect for sovereignty; (iv) stability and security; and (v) a stronger voice in the architecture of the global order. This emphasises the demand side that any great power must satisfy – or at least move towards satisfying – to be taken seriously on the continent.
(2) We then evaluate how African governments and the broader body politic judge the US and China, revealing where each power falls short against the determined priorities. The result of this evaluation is not a binary choice. It is what we term ‘managed dependence': a strategy of maintaining relationships with multiple external powers while attempting to extract maximum benefit from each.
(3) Following from this, we map how African states are positioned vis-à-vis China and the US, presenting a mosaic of what we refer to as hedgers, balancers, and aligners whose national strategies deviate from any common continental posture. Included in this section is a depiction of the available data on African perceptions of both the US and China. For instance, according to Afrobarometer data, around 60% of respondents across the countries surveyed in 2024/25 view China's economic and political influence as “somewhat” or “very” positive, slightly ahead of the US at 52% and the European Union at 50%. Similar outcomes are revealed in the Gallup data, though an Ichikowitz Foundation survey of 15 countries found a sharper pro-China tilt amongst younger Africans, with 77% of 18–25-year-olds seeing China as influential in Africa, versus 67% for the US.
(4) From this baseline, the paper argues that strategic diversification is the only viable choice for African policymakers, but that this is not a passive condition. It requires sequential, deliberate capacity-building to be effective. The question that arises from this analysis for African policymakers is not whether US-China competition offers opportunities, but whether the institutional capacity exists to seize them? The answer, we argue, lies in whether African political systems will have the coherence and patience to make choices that transcend short-term temptations and override the long-term imperative of building sovereign capacity.
(5) The final section turns to the hard implication: the US-China rivalry creates negotiating space for African countries, but only for those that have already built the capacity to use it. Those who haven't, by implication, will see risks trumping opportunities as the US and China vie for influence across the continent.
In effect, we argue that the US-China competition in Africa turns on a contradiction. On the surface, African states have more leverage than ever: two great powers are competing for their minerals, markets, and strategic position. Yet structurally, Africa cannot yet convert its apparent value into structural transformation. This tension is at the paper's core. African agency is real but bounded. Converting competition into durable sovereignty requires sequential capacity that most African states do not yet possess: the ability to tax, to industrialise, to integrate regionally, and to mobilise capital on their own terms. Without that foundation, leverage is an illusion.
The paper therefore rejects the binary framing that dominates the debate. The question is not "China or the US?" It is whether African states can build sufficient sovereign capacity to occupy the space between two great powers so that Africa can engage with both on terms that serve domestic priorities rather than the interests of those engaged in this external strategic rivalry. This is strategic diversification: not neutrality, but the capacity to walk away. It is partial sovereignty on top of dependent foundations, manageable only if states are deliberate about sequencing: fiscal capacity first, industrial policy second, regional integration third. And a call for Africa to negotiate collectively rather than as fragmented bilateral bargainers.
The next decade will be decisive. The infrastructure, mines, data centres, loans, and governance frameworks adopted now will shape Africa's position for a generation. The question is whether African policymakers and business leaders have the coherence and patience to make these choices deliberately, or whether they will be made for them by external actors whose interests are not aligned with Africa's.
This matters concretely for African business. When governments negotiate from fragmented postures, firms absorb the costs: inconsistent standards, sudden regulatory shifts, and terms dictated by others. When national policy is anchored in domestic priorities and aligned with continental frameworks, it sets predictable rules on digital standards, local content, and technology transfer — giving African firms stronger backing when they bargain with Chinese or US partners.

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